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advantages  over alternative approaches to  the analysis  of revealed
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for modelling the discrete  - continuous choice problem of policy makers  in
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1.  Introduction
The analysis  of government behavior in agriculture has  increasingly
attracted the attention of agricultural economists.  Analyses have
employed a variety of methods ranging from simple policy reaction
functions  to attempts at developing structural models  of the political
economic markets  in agriculture  (e.g. Rausser  et  al.,  1982).  One of
these approaches which appears  to have been very popular  in the past is
based on policy preference  functions  of the agricultural policy decision
maker(s)  (e.g. Riethmuller and Roe,  1986),  where policy preferences can be
obtained either by interviewing policy makers  (Frisch, 1971)  or via
econometric estimation processes.
In this paper, we will develop an alternative approach to  determine
policy preference functions.  We  refer to  this  approach as  DEBET  (Decision
Based Economic Theory).  The central feature of this approach is  that it
makes use not only of actual policy decisions but also of information
contained in policy alternatives, and that  it  facilitates modelling the
complex discrete  - continuous choice problem of policy makers  in a multi-
instrument framework (Oskam, 1988).
The remainder  of this paper will be structured as  follows.  First, we
will briefly discuss  the principle pros and cons of standard methods used
in the analysis of government behavior and compare them with DEBET
2(section 2).  In section 3 we will apply DEBET to US  Wheat policy
decisions between 1981  and 1990.  We will conclude with a brief summary of
this  analysis' results.
2.  The Principles of DEBET
The analysis of relationships between policy objectives and policy
instruments has a long and successful history in the economics profession
(Tinbergen,  1952).  In order to  determine policy preference functions
numerous methods have been developed and applied in empirical  analyses.
One  avenue of research has focused on analyzing the answers  of policy
makers  to questionaires in which they were asked to  reveal their policy
preferences either by offering them a number  of alternative policy
scenarios  (Frisch, 1971)  or through interactive  optimization (Wallenius et
al.,  1978).  The main shortcomings  of this  approach are that policy makers
may not reveal their true  policy preferences in interviews,  and that the
policy alternatives offered by the interviewer may not capture the  full
range of scenarios considered relevant by the policy makers.  Due to
these drawbacks this method for the analysis of policy makers' preferences
has not been widely used in agricultural economic research.
The main competing methodological alternative, namely to  estimate
policy preference functions  econometrically, has been employed numerous
times.  (e.g. Rausser and Freebairn, 1974;  Frey, 1978;  Riethmuller and
Roe,  1986;  von Witzke, 1990).  Its  advantages  are obvious.  One  can easily
derive testable hypotheses from public choice theoretical models  of policy
decision makers who are assumed to maximize  the value of  their preference
function.  Suitable data for such analyses are usually available without
3major difficulty.  However, frequent changes  in the structure of policy
making limits  the applicability of  this method because  the  time periods
between structural changes may be very short  for econometric analyses.
Moreover, policy preference functions are difficult to  derive
theoretically and to estimate empirically if more than one policy
instrument  is employed.1
As we shall discuss below, DEBET has a number of advantages over  the
standard methods  of endogenous policy analysis mentioned above.  It can be
applied without major difficulties  in the multi-instrument case,  and it
can be employed in the analysis of relatively short periods of time,  as
it makes use of additional  information not commonly used in the analysis
of revealed preferences of governments.
The  central reason for  this  is  that DEBET also uses  the information
contained in alternative instruments  and/or instrument levels which have
been considered but have not been agreed upon.  More specifically, DEBET
uses information not only of actual decisions but also of what we will
refer to  as  'non-decisions'.  Actual decisions  include not only decisions
to  introduce or discontinue a policy instrument or  to change  the  level of
an instrument but also decisions that result in no change, provided that
changes have been considered.  Non-decisions  represent alternatives which
have been considered but which have been rejected in the decision making
process.  Of course, the  informational content of non-decisions is
the higher the closer they are  to  actual decisions.  This is well known
from the general  theory of revealed preferences (e.g. Varian, 1982).
1 For details see Ancot et al.  (1982).
4DEBET only requires an ordinal preference ranking of alternatives  in
the form of decisions and non-decisions.  This has  an obvious advantage.
However, the drawback is  that one needs a  larger number of observations  to
determine the preference function.  Hence, DEBET's comparative advantage
in the analysis of government behavior is  in cases in which the number of
actual  decisions for a given political economic  structure  is  small
relative to non-decisions.
Let
v - f(xl,  ..........  Xn;w)  (1)
where
v  - value of the objective  function
Xi - objective variable;  i-l,...,n
w  - parameter vector.
If for two vectors  of objective variables one  is  strictly preferred
over  the other, e.g. if X1,..... ,Xn is  strictly preferred over
X1,.....,Xn, it  follows  that
f(Xl  ..... ,Xn;w) >  f(X 1,  .......  n;w)  (2)
The parameter vector  (w) is not necessarily determined by any given
ordering of policy preferences.  Depending on the particular form of the
objective function and the nature of the  empirical observations it may as
well be that w  is not determined, i.e.,  that there  is  an infinite number
of feasible parameter vectors,  or that w  is  over-determined.  In this  case
there would be no feasible  solution for w.  Over-determination of the
policy preference function may be  due to a variety of reasons  such as
observational errors and other random effects or imperfect  information of
5policy makers regarding the actual economic impacts  of policy decisions.
One way to  derive the parameters of the objective function is to
minimize the inconsistencies  in decision making via linear or non-linear
optimization.  For this purpose we define the  following inconsistency
parameters:
aj  < f(Xlj  ...... Xnj;w)-f(Xlj ....... Xnj;w)  (3)
A solution to  the problem can then be found by minimizing the sum of
inconsistencies:2
J
min Z  aj  (4)
j-1
such that
v(Xlj.......Xnj;w) - f(Xlj ...... Xnj;w) + aj  20  (5)
aj  2 0;  j-1,.....,J
Moreover, the elements  of w have  to be normalized to prevent a trivial
solution (Oskam, 1988).
The optimal solution of  this programming problem yields:
(i)  the parameters of  the objective  function;
(ii)  the  total  inconsistency for the functional  form of the objective
function;  of course,  the theoretical minimum value of the  total
inconsistency  is  zero;  and
2 If the objective function is non-linear in the parameters the
different function needs  to be  differentiable and quasi concave  in w  (for
details see Oskam  (1988).
6(iii)  information on those  decisions which are  inconsistent.
The DEBET approach to  endogenous policy modelling can be  illustrated
graphically.  For simplicity of illustration assume a linear objective
function and  two  decisions.  Assume  further that  w i 2 0, i = 1,2.
Xll  w 1 + X21  2 >  0  (6)
X12 w1 +  X22  2 >  0  (7)
Xij  = Xij  - Xj  , i = 1,2;  j = 1,2  (8)
Eqs.  (6) and (7) define the preference  space.  As mentioned above,  one
of the  following three  outcomes will  result:
(1) The relative parameter values  are not determined  (figure 1).
(2) The  relative parameter values wl  and w2 are just determined
(figure 2).
(3) The relative parameter values  are over-determined (figure  3).  The
preference spaces overlap.  A solution as  is  (2) can then be  obtained
by adding an  inconsistency variable  (Oskam 1988).
Fig. 1:  Undetermined preference  Fig.  2:  Just  determined
function  preference function
W2 W2
0  w1 0  W1
7Fig.  3:  Overdetermined preference
function
w2
0  W 1
3.  Empirical Analysis
The application of DEBET requires  the determination of relevant
policy objectives.  The  following objectives  have consistently been
mentioned by close observers of US farm policy (e.g. Gardner, 1987;
Rausser et al.,  1982;  Cochrane and Ryan, 1976;  Hathaway, 1963):
(1) Agricultural  income support;
(2) Restricting budgetary expenditures  caused by agricultural policy
interventions;
(3)  Maintaining reasonably low food prices, especially for  low income
households.
Besides these main objectives a number of  additional  goals  has been
mentioned.  They include  the  following:
(4) High volume of production;  this may be an  important variable for
agricultural policy decision making because  input and food processing
industries'  as well  as  trading companies'  profits depend on the volume
of production;
(5) High export volume  or high share in world exports;
(6) Stability of producer and consumer prices;
8(7) Development assistance such as  Food Aid;
(8) Soil conservation.
In the following analysis we will consider objectives  (1) to  (5).  The
functional  form of  the objective function is assumed to be linear.3 Hence:
5
v - z  wiXi  (9)
i-l
Wheat policy instruments  included in the empirical analysis are:4
(1)  Loan rate,5
(2)  Deficiency payment,
(3)  Export subsidies,
(4)  Base acreage and program yields,
(5)  Acreage diversion/land conservation and set  aside programs,
(6)  CCC-storage operations  (destocking),
(7)  Farmer owned reserve  (FOR) programmes,
(8)  Payment limitations,
(9)  Disaster payment,
(10) Crop  insurance,
(11)  Food aid under PL-480,
(12)  Food stamps programs.
3 We have chosen a linear objective function here  due to a lack of a
priori information.  Of course, linear objective functions can be employed
in empirical analyses without major problems.  As we  shall see,  the
linearity assumption yields quite reasonable  results.
4 For a survey of US wheat policies  in the  1980s  see Harwood and
Young  (1989).
5 Including the Findley adjustment.
9Decisions  on these wheat policy instruments  and their levels have been
made  in the course  of regular agricultural policy decisions  as well as in
Farm Bills.  During the  time period analyzed here, two Farm Bills were
passed, namely the Agriculture and Food Act of  1981  (AFA '81)  and the
Food Security Act of 1985  (FSA '85).  Farm Bills are usually rather
comprehensive packages, changing the mix of policy  instruments as  well as
the level of instrument use, while decisions between Farm Bills tend to
affect only instrument  levels.
Decisions  and non-decisions included in the analysis and their
effects  are depicted in table  1.  A brief description of both decisions
and non-decisions  is contained in the Appendix.  The economic effects
exhibited in table 1 have been calculated based using WHEATSIM (Chattin et
al.,  1985).  WHEATSIM is a simulation model of the United States  wheat
market, designed to  analyze domestic wheat policy alternatives.  The model
consists of a supply block distinguishing between acreage and yield, a
demand block with domestic and export demand, and a block dealing with
stocks  including commercial  stocks, CCC stocks  and farmer-owned reserve.
The main policy instruments of WHEATSIM are:
(1)  price policy instruments  such as  loan rate and deficiency payments,
(2) different types of acreage reduction and soil conservation programs,
(3) stock management by the CCC and farmer-owned reserve.
The model contains a deterministic part and a stochastic part.  In this
paper only the deterministic part has been used.
10Table  1:  US Wheat Policy Decisions and Non-decisions, 1981-1990.
Change in
Decision or  Producer  Consumer  Budgetary  Export  Produc-
Non-decision  Surplus  Surplus  Expenditure  tion
(in bin dollar)  (in bin dollar)
1981 Agriculture
and Food Act  -1.71  0.40  1.60  0.09  -0.24
1982 annual  decision  -0.89  - 0.92  - -0.09
1983 annual  decision  0.39  - -0.33  - -0.13
1984 annual decision  -1.17  0.41  0.85  0.09 
1985  annual decision  -1.62  0.65  1.09  0.14  0.03
1985 Food Security
Act  -2.87  3.58  2.46  1.08  -0.09
Harkin-Gephardt
Proposal  6.88  -13.52  6.41  -3.07  -2.22
Administration
Proposal  -4.66  -0.01  4.75  -0.01  -0.01
1986 annual  decision  -0.83  0.35  0.57  0.07  -0.05
1987 annual  decision  -0.43  0.13  0.33  0.05  -0.01
1988  annual  decision  -0.27  0.05  0.22  0.02  -0.02
1989  annual  decision  0.48  0.31  -0.78  0.07  0.18
1990 annual  decision  -0.03  0.06  -0.03  0.02  0.04
Source:  see appendix.
Based on the economic effects of policy decisions and non-decisions
the policy preference function can be determined based on the  theoretical
framework discussed in section 2.  The results  are exhibited in table 2.
The weights of the  preference function are normalized on the budget such
that this weight is  equal to  one.  Not surprisingly, the weight attached
to producers exceeds one, while the weight attached to consumers  is
clearly below 1.  The volume of production does not appear  to be an
important policy objective while the volume of exports  is.  Quite
remarkably, the policy inconsistency observed is zero during the  time
period analyzed here.
11Table 2  Parameters of  the U.S. wheat policy preference  function,
1981-1990.
Policy objective  Weight
Producer income  (dollar)  1.02
Consumer income  (dollar)  0.70
Budget  (dollar)  1.00
Export  (bushel)  1.13
Production  (bushel)  0.19
Policy inconsistency (bln dollar)  0
4.  Summary and Conclusions
It  is  appealing to  analyze the  differences  in the  results between our
estimates  of political weights  and those  found by other authors.  However,
this  is not possible at this  early stage of  scientific penetration of the
problem.  There are  a number of reasons for this.  The  time periods on
which the various  analyses are based differ and political weights may
change over  time.  Moreover, the  functional  form used in this  analysis
differs  from those in other analyses.  Unlike other analyses on this
issue, our analysis  includes more than one wheat policy instrument as well
as  information on non-decisions.
The empirical  results obtained through DEBET for US wheat policy  (and
earlier for EC dairy policy  (Oskam, 1988))  are  interesting and certainly
plausible.  We  feel, however, that further comparative analyses  of
alternative approaches to  deriving policy preference  functions are
necessary in order to better evaluate DEBET's  suitability for  the analysis
of endogenous policy decisions.
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14Appendix:  Selected US Wheat policy decisions and non-decisions,
1981-1990.
1.  The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981  (AFA '81)  contained only minor
policy changes, such as  reducing the loan rate and increasing acreage
diversion, relative  to  the  trend between 1977  and 1981.  Assumed
changes  in the loan rate  (for 1982,  1983,  and 1984 repectively):
0, 0, -40 cts per bushel;  target price -5, -10,  -12  cts per bushel;
unpaid diversion rate +5%,  +5%,  +10%;  paid diversion rate 0, +10%,  +5%
(Based on adjusted version of WHEATSIM).
2.  Annual decision of  1982.  The  set aside requirements were raised to
15%  for those participating in the government programs.
3.  Annual decision of 1983.  Introduction of paid diversion of max. 20 %
of the base acreage with a diversion payment of 2.7  dollar per bushel
(PIK program).
4.  Annual decision of 1984. Reduction in  the loan rate  and the target
price compared with levels  suggested in AFA  '81.  Basic loan rate
decreases  from 3.70 dollar per bushel to  3.30  dollar per bushel;
target price from 3.45  to  3.38 dollar per bushel. A reduction of the
paid land diversion from 20  to  15  % of the base acreage.
5.  Annual decision of 1985.  Reducing the basic loan rate and the  target
price compared with the  indicated levels  in the AFA  '81. Basic  loan
rate decreases from 3.95  to  3.30 dollar per bushel;  target price from
154.65 to 4.38 dollar per bushel. Further reduction of the paid land
diversion from 15  to  10  % of the base acreage.
6.  Food Security Act of 1985  (FSA '85);  The  instruments  of this  act, such
as  loan rates,  target prices,  set aside, etc. have been compared with
a continuation of the  instruments used in 1985.  Instruments have been
set at actual levels  over the period 1986-1989. This  is  also the
evaluation period. Based on the original version of WHEATSIM.
7.  Harkin-Gephardt proposal. This proposal uses  a slightly adjusted
version of WHEATSIM to  evaluate the proposal  over the period 1986-
1990. The main elements of this proposal are:  (1) to  increase the  loan
rate to  71%  (and up to  80%)  of the parity price,  (2) to  increase
mandatory set-aside and diversion and (3) to  drop deficiency payments.
Set aside and diversion have been made more effective  (coefficient
0.7).  Additional reduction of production costs due to  long term set-
aside.  This proposal failed in the decision making process. Although
the  long-term effects  of this policy proposal are very important, we
evaluated the proposal only over a five year period.
8.  Administration proposal. A further reduction of  the basic loan rate
and the target price of 10%.  Evaluation over  the period 1987-1989.
This proposal  failed in the decision making process.
9.  Annual decision of 1986. Reducing the basic loan rate  from 3.30 dollar
per bushel to  3 dollar per bushel.  Small  increase of  the set-aside
16from 20  to  23  % of the base acreage.  Reduction in the paid diversion
(from 10  to  5 %) and the diversion payment.
10.  Annual decision of 1987.  Introduction of the  Findley adjustment scheme;
its main feature is  a reduction of the loan rate. Increase  in set aside
requirement to  28%  of the base acreage. Reduction of paid land
diversion.
11.  Annual decision of  1988. Further reduction of  the basic loan rate from
2.85  to  2.71 dollar per bushel;  Findley adjustment continues. Reduction
of the target price from 4.38  to 4.23 dollar per bushel.
12.  Annual decision of  1989. Decreasing the basic  loan rate  from 2.76  to
2.58 dollar per bushel and the target price from 4.23  to 4.10 dollar
per bushel. Reduction of set aside requirement to  10  % of the base
acreage.
13.  Annual decision of 1990.  Reduction of set  aside requirement to  5 % of
the base acreage.
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